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Family Values and the Regulation of Labor
* 
 
Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms 
can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures 
with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family 
ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony 
power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, 
we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, 
are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also 
positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market 
rigidities. Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning 
of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests 
that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots. 
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Reformers have been routinely frustrated by a widespread opposition to what economists
would consider eﬃcient labor market reforms in Continental Europe where high ﬁring
costs, binding minimum wages and various other employment protection rules abound.
Most economists, although with varying emphasis, would argue that these regulations
are at least in part responsible for the high European unemployment from the eighties
onward.1 But these regulations survive. Why? The most common explanations rely
upon various versions of the insider-outsider model, in which unionized "inside" workers
want to preserve their rents and want to avoid competition from the outsiders.2 However,
this interpretation does not explain why insiders are more powerful in some countries
than in others. In addition, the logic of this model implies that the "outsiders" should
oppose labor regulations, but in reality this is not the case. In Continental Europe labor
regulations are broadly supported. In fact those that could be considered outsiders favor
extending the coverage to themselves as well rather than liberalizing the labor market.
In the present paper we provide a diﬀerent explanation, based upon the complemen-
tarity between the strength of family ties and the stringency of labor market regulation.
Flexible labor markets require that individuals move geographically in order to maximize
their opportunities, ﬁnd the best match with a ﬁrm and get the best paid job. This
is eﬃcient when mobility is painless. However, in certain cultures, staying close to the
extended family (from now on "family" in short) is important and the mobility required
by a free labor market can be painful. With unregulated labor markets, local ﬁrms would
have a monopsonistic power over immobile workers, who would demand labor regulation
to counteract this power. This can lead to two diﬀerent equilibria. One is laissez-faire,
1For instance, for a balanced view see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
2The original formulation of the insider outsider model is in Lindbeck and Snower (1989). One of the
most recent version of this argument which also incorporates product market (de)regulation is Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003).
2with high mobility and unregulated labor markets; this occurs when family ties are weak.
When family ties are strong, there is another equilibrium with labor market rigidity com-
prising minimum wage and ﬁring restrictions. Given the cultural value placed on family
ties, labor market regulation is preferable to laissez-faire. Even though laissez-faire pro-
duces higher income per capita it rareﬁes family relations. If family ties are suﬃciently
strong this relaxation of family relationships can reduce individual utility so much that
welfare can be higher with a regulated labor market.3
An innovative feature of our model is that individuals can choose the degree of family
ties, or to be more realistic, they can educate their children in a certain way. This implies
a two way eﬀect between family ties and labor market regulation. An inherited culture of
strong family ties leads to a preference for labor market rigidities, but the latter in turn
makes it optimal to teach and adopt strong family ties. Thus economic incentives explain
the evolution of cultural values and the other way around. This argument may explain
two things. On the positive side, why certain countries have more regulated labor markets
than others, as function of diﬀerent values placed on family ties. Note that Scandinavian
countries, despite their stronger social protection, have ﬂexible labor markets, the so called
"ﬂexisecurity" system. Indeed, these countries have the weakest family ties in the OECD.
Second, our argument is consistent with the broad support for labor market regulation
in Continental Europe that goes beyond the insider outsider cleavage. Moreover, the
transmission of cultural values across generations implies that the strength of family ties
can persist over time and can have a long lasting impact on labor market regulation. On
the normative side, it explains why it has proved so diﬃcult to reform labor markets in
many Southern and Central European countries.
In our empirical analysis we document the interactions between family ties, labor
3Our model does not have home production, but with strong family ties hours not spent at work can
be devoted to work at home. Thus adding home production would reinforce the result of the model
because lower work in the market would be less costly in strong family ties societies.
3market institutions and outcomes. We measure family ties as in Alesina and Giuliano
(2007, 2009) using answers from the World Values Survey and we show that countries
with strong family ties implement more stringent labor market regulations. We motivate
our story using cross country data, but our main empirical contribution relies upon micro
evidence. We show that individuals with strong family ties are more likely to believe
that job security is a critical feature of a job and would like government regulation to
insure it. In order to document the transmission of family values across generations,
which drives the long run relations between family ties, labor market regulation and labor
market outcomes in our model, we then focus on U.S. immigrants.4 We show that second
generation immigrants from countries with strong family ties are less mobile and face a
wage and employment penalty. They also ask for more government regulation of wages
and job security. Moreover, we show that the strength of family values inherited from
the countries of origin before World War II is positively correlated with the stringency of
labor market regulation in the countries of origin at the beginning of the 21st century.
The present paper is at the intersection of three strands of the literature. One is the
vast area of research on labor market institutions and labor market performance.5 The
second is the one referred to as cultural economics. This literature has investigated the
importance of cultural traits in the determination of economic outcomes,6 the transmission
of cultural values,7 and only recently the interaction between cultural values and economic
4Cultural values are relatively slow to evolve, as a vast literature on the behavior of immigrants to
other countries, mainly the US, shows. See for instance Alesina and Giuliano (2007), Algan and Cahuc
(2005), Fernandez and Fogli (2006, 2009), Giuliano (2007), Guiso et al. (2006), Luttmer and Singhal
(2009) amongst many others. This literature shows that cultural values, including the organization of
the family, persist among generations even when individuals move to other countries.
5See the recent surveys of Eichhorst et al. (2008) and Freeman (2008).
6See Carroll et al. (1994), Guiso et al., (2006, 2009), Tabellini (2008a), Algan and Cahuc (2009b),
Fernandez and Fogli (2007), Alesina and Giuliano (2007, 2009), Giavazzi et al. (2009).
7See Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Their model has been applied to the transmission of religious
beliefs (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, and Bisin et al., 2004), of education (Patacchini and Zenou, 2006), of
ethnic identity (Bisin et al. 2006), of moral values (Tabellini, 2008b) and the transmission of priors about
the trustworthiness of others (Guiso et al. 2008).
4institutions.8 In particular several papers have investigated the role of the family in this
context.9 The third strand of literature stresses the complementarity between investment
in local social ties, including friends and family, and geographical immobility.10
We contribute to this literature by looking at the interplay and coevolution of labor
market institutions and a speciﬁc cultural trait of a society, the strength of family ties.11
Regarding the role of family ties, Alesina and Giuliano (2007, 2009) oﬀer a broad set of
results including the fact that strong family ties are related to low geographical mobility,
an essential building bloc of the model in the present paper.12 This is reasonable: strong
family ties bring more beneﬁts if family members live close to each other. They also show
that participation in the labor market (especially of women and youngsters ) is lower with
strong family ties, a result also consistent with the implication of the model of the present
8Related to the inﬂuence of culture on regulation, Algan and Cahuc (2009a) investigate the role of
civic virtue on labor market institutions. They show that unemployment beneﬁts are higher in countries
displaying higher level of civicness since the degree of moral hazard associated with the use of government
beneﬁts is dampened in those countries. On the link from regulation and institutions to culture, Alesina
and Angeletos (2005), Alesina, Cozzi and Manotovan (2009), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Aghion
et al. (2008) and Aghion et al. (2009) show that regulation can shape beliefs like the demand for
redistribution or beliefs in cooperation. Tabellini extends the cultural transmission framework of Bisin
and Verdier (2001), allowing the interaction of cultural norms with instutions. In Tabellini’s model,
cultural norms are crucial in perpetuating the eﬀect of any institutional characteristic (such as the
quality of law enforcement). If initial conditions are favorable, individuals wil vote for legal enforcement
and will transmit values of generalized coooperation to their children. On the contrary, when initial
conditions are not so favorable, individuals will transmit values of lower cooperation and vote for limited
law enforcement.
9See for instance Guttman and Yacouel (2007), Guttman (2001a,b) Tabellini (2008), Bisn and Verdier
(2000) amongst others.
10Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) argue that individuals who perceive themselves as being
strongly attached to a village, a township or a region, may invest in local social capital, because the
returns from these local ties are high while, on the other hand, strong local social capital raises the cost
of mobility and in turn reduces incentives to move. Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a) show that interactions
between social ties and moving decisions can explain the diﬀerent behaviors of workers in diﬀerent groups,
regions, or countries in an endogenous way by showing the existence of multiple equilibria. Glaeser and
Redlick (2008) show that it is possible that an area can get caught in a bad equilibrium where the
prospect of out-migration reduces social capital investment and a lack of social capital investment makes
out-migration more appealing. David, Janiak and Wasmer (2009) build a model that can include two
diﬀerent equilibria: strong local social capital and low mobility vs. low social capital and high propensity
to move.
11We focus on family rather friends because individuals who have many friends somewhere are also
those who may have many others elsewhere. This problem does not arise with family ties since one does
not choose one’s parents.
12See also Belot and Ermisch (2006), Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004b), Zorlu (2009).
5paper. Alesina and Giuliano (2007), Algan and Cahuc (2005) and Giuliano (2007) also
show how family features can shape fertility and employment patterns.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
documents the empirical relationship between family ties and the demand for labor market
regulation. Section 4 examines the persistent eﬀects of family ties on attitudes and labor
market regulation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The setup
There are two goods: labor and a numeraire good produced with labor and a continuum
of individuals of mass one. Individuals are uniformly located on the [0,1] line. They are
identical, risk neutral and have no preference for leisure: their utility is equal to the sum
of their consumption and a term that represents the valuation of family ties to be deﬁned
below. The timing is as follows:
1. At birth, every individual is located on the [0,1] line, on a point where her parents
live. Then, individuals choose family values which can be either with strong family ties or
with low family ties. The choice of family values is irreversible. In reality family values
are "chosen" by parents and transmitted to children. However for the sake of simplicity
we collapse the model to a static case without intergenerational transmission of values.
Below we also make some progress toward extending our model in a dynamic direction.
The share of individuals with strong family ties is σ ∈ [0,1]. Strong family ties yield an
utility Δ(σ) > 0, if an individual lives in the same location as her parents, and a disutility
−Δ(σ) if he/she lives elsewhere. An individual with weak family ties is indiﬀerent between
living in his location of birth or elsewhere, thus Δ=0 . We assume Δ (σ) ≥ 0 for two
reasons. First, social norms are generally more inﬂuential when they are more spread
around. Living in a community where most people have strong family ties create a strong
6social norm to which one feels an incentive to conform. Second, when the share of the
population with strong family ties is larger, individuals with weak family ties and those
who do not live in the neighborhood of their parents have less opportunities to have social
interactions. This may imply that the relative value of strong family ties compared to
weak family ties (which is normalized to zero) increases with the share of individuals with
strong family ties. Note the diﬀerence between the mobility costs associated with family
ties and those associated with simple transaction costs of moving. The latter are not
a choice variable and depend on the technology of transportation. Besides they are in
general not decreasing with the number of people who move; and can even increase in
case of congestion.
2. With majority rule individuals vote on labor market regulation. By assumption
there are two possible types of labor market policy: either labor market ﬂexibility (i.e.
laissez-faire on the labor market), or regulation of wages and employment based upon
two instruments, a minimum wage and job protection. These two instruments (described
in more detail below) are necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that the market equilibrium
is Pareto eﬃcient when there are mobility costs.
3. Firms oﬀer labor contracts. When a worker is hired in his initial location, his
productivity y is drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. Every worker
can ﬁnd a job with productivity 1 in a place diﬀerent from his initial location. Job
protection constrains ﬁrms to keep all employees whose productivity is above a threshold
value denoted by R ∈ [0,1]. Job protection entails deadweight losses c ∈ [0,1/2), that is
the production of a worker who draws the productivity y is equal to y −c, instead of y.13
In each location, there is a single ﬁrm that oﬀers labor contracts. In this setup, workers
are paid at their reservation wage, which can be lower than their productivity if there are
13The latter can take a variety of forms, including the distortionary cost of taxation needed to provide
unemployment subsides for those not employed in distorted labor market. We do not explicitly model
this channel.
7mobility costs.14 When there is a minimum wage, workers can be either employed and
paid the minimum wage, denoted by w, or unemployed. They are unemployed if their
productivity y is below the reservation productivity R of the ﬁrm.
The nature of these assumptions should be clear. A worker with weak family ties
would always manage to ﬁnd a job with productivity y =1s i n c eh eb e a r sn oc o s t so f
mobility. A worker with strong family ties has a moving cost of 2Δ(σ). Without labor
market regulation, workers with strong family ties face the monopsony power of ﬁrms.
Labor market regulation protects these workers against those ﬁrms.
2.2 Solution
The model is solved by backward induction.
i) In stage 3, the labor market is either regulated or ﬂexible, and the share of individuals
with strong family ties is given.
Flexible labor market
If the labor market is ﬂexible, individuals with weak family ties obtain a wage equal
to 1 by moving at no cost. Their utility level is
U
W
F =1 . (1)
Individuals with strong family ties get a wage equal to 1 if they decide to leave their
initial location, but the move costs them 2Δ(σ). Therefore, their reservation wage, which
is necessarily non negative, is equal to max[0,1 − 2Δ(σ)]. Thus individuals with strong
family ties get a wage equal to 0 and stay in their initial location if Δ(σ) is larger than
1/2. In that case, their utility is equal to the valuation of family ties, Δ(σ). If Δ(σ) is
smaller than 1/2, two possibilities can arise.
14The important assumption here is that mobility costs decrease wages. This property could be obtained
in a search and matching model à la Mortensen and Pissarides, see e.g. Pissarides (2000).
81. If their productivity in their initial location is larger than their reservation wage,
equal to 1 − 2Δ(σ), they keep their job in their initial location. In that case, they
are paid their reservation wage and they are immobile. Their utility is equal to their
reservation wage plus the valuation of family ties, i.e. 1−2Δ(σ)+Δ(σ)=1−Δ(σ)
2. If their productivity in their initial location is smaller than their reservation wage,
individuals with strong family ties are not hired. Since Δ(σ) < 1/2, individuals
with strong family ties prefer to move and get a utility equal to 1 − Δ(σ).




F = max[Δ(σ),1 − Δ(σ)]. (2)
Rigid labor market
If the labor market is regulated, the government sets a minimum wage and job pro-
tection. For every worker, the probability to get a job oﬀer in the ﬁrm located in his/her
initial birth place is equal to the probability to draw a productivity y larger than the
reservation productivity R. With the uniform distribution, this probability is equal to
1 − R. If the productivity is higher than R, individuals can get the minimum wage w in
their birth place, or leave the ﬁrm and obtain a wage equal to 1 − c elsewhere, where
c denotes deadweight losses associated with job protection.15 R and w are determined
endogenously below in equilibrium. When the productivity is lower than R, individuals
get either zero income if they do not move, or a wage equal to 1 − c if they move.
Individuals with weak family ties get the expected utility
U
W
R =( 1− R)max(1 − c,w)+R(1 − c). (3)
15Assuming that ﬁrms can make counter oﬀers so that only weak family ties workers with productivity
y<1 − c and strong family ties workers with productivity y<1 − c − 2Δ(σ) move, would not change
the qualitative results of the model.
9The expected utility of individuals with strong family ties is
U
S
R =( 1− R)max[w +Δ ( σ),1 − c − Δ(σ)] + Rmax[Δ(σ),1 − c − Δ(σ)] (4)
ii) In stage 2, people vote on the labor market policy: either regulation or ﬂexibility.
The share of individuals with strong family ties, chosen in stage one, is given. There are
only two types of voters, so that the median voter can have either strong family ties or
w e a kf a m i l yt i e s .W ea s s u m et h a tt h eo w n e r so ft h eﬁ r m sd on o tv o t e .I ft h e yd i dt h e y
would always prefer labor market ﬂexibility regardless of the level of family ties therefore
they have a dominant strategy to vote for ﬂexibility. Their share of votes should be simply
added to those who vote for laissez-faire.16
- Individuals with weak family ties obtain UW
F =1under labor market ﬂexibility, and
UW
R < 1 under labor market regulation.17 When the labor market is rigid, the expected
utility of workers with weak family ties is smaller than 1 because R ∈ [0,1] and the
wage cannot be larger than 1 − c, otherwise ﬁrms would get negative proﬁts. Therefore,
individuals with weak family ties always prefer labor market ﬂexibility. This implies that
t h eo u t c o m eo ft h ev o t ei sl a b o rm a r k e tﬂ e x i b i l i t yi ft h es h a r eo fp e o p l ew i t hs t r o n gf a m i l y
ties, σ, is smaller than 1/2.
- Now, consider the case where σ>1/2, so that the median voter has strong family
ties. For the sake of simplicity, assume that all individuals with strong family ties are
immobile if the majority of the population has strong family ties under ﬂexible labor






16 In case workers own stocks of ﬁrms then some of them would face a trade oﬀ between their interest
as stock holders and those as workers. We do not explore this extension here. In most countries the
percentage of individuals who hold stocks of individual ﬁrms is very small.
17When the labor market is rigid, the expected utility of workers with weak family ties is smaller than
1 because R ∈ [0,1] and the wage cannot be larger than 1−c. Otherwise ﬁrms would get negative proﬁts.
10This assumption implies that when the labor market is regulated, workers with strong
family ties do not move. This case is easier to illustrate and we do so in the text. The
general case without that assumption is in the appendix.
Assumption 1 implies that the expected utility of individuals with strong family ties
when the labor market is ﬂexible and when σ>1/2 is:
U
S
F =Δ ( σ) (5)
On the other hand, the expected utility in the regulated scenario is given by:
U
S
R =( 1− R)w +Δ ( σ). (6)
Comparison of equations (5) and (6) shows that those with strong family ties prefer a
regulated labor market rather than a ﬂexible one.
The optimal labor market regulation is the set of values of the minimum wage w and
of the reservation productivity R that maximizes the expected utility of workers with
strong family ties, as deﬁned by equation (6) and subject to the zero proﬁt condition
  1
R
(y − c − w)dy =0 . (7)
It is easily checked that the solution is
R = c and w =
1 − c
2
which implies w>R (8)
The solution shows that labor market regulation comprises a binding minimum wage and
job protection which forces ﬁrms to keep employees whose productivity is lower than
their labor cost. In this equilibrium, every worker with strong family ties can be either
employed (with probability 1 − c) or unemployed (with probability c) and remains in his
initial location. Proﬁts are equal to zero. The wage is smaller than 1 and also smaller than
t h ew a g eu n d e rﬂ e x i b l el a b o rm a r k e t s .E m p l o y m e n ti se q u a lt o1−σc, since all individuals
with weak family ties are employed (the share of individuals with strong family ties is
11equal to σ, and a share c of individuals with strong family ties are unemployed). Thus
employment is lower when the labor market is regulated, since employment is equal to 1
when the labor market is ﬂexible. Workers with strong family ties get the expected utility







+Δ ( σ) (9)
which is larger than Δ(σ), the utility they would get if the labor market were ﬂexible.
In conclusion, the outcome of the vote is for market regulation if σ>1/2 ;a n df o r
labor market ﬂexibility otherwise.
iii) In stage 1, individuals choose their family values with perfect foresights. If they
anticipate that the share of individuals with strong family ties is smaller than 1/2, they
know that labor market ﬂexibility will prevail. Otherwise, the outcome of the vote will
be labor market regulation. Therefore, the payoﬀ of individuals with strong family ties is
 




and the payoﬀ of individuals with weak family ties is18
 
1 if σ ≤ 1/2
1 − c if σ>1/2.
Thus, the utility gains of choosing strong family ties rather than weak family ties are
Γ(σ)=
 
max[Δ(σ),1 − Δ(σ)] − 1 if σ ≤ 1/2
Δ(σ) − 1−c2
2 if σ>1/2.
In a Nash equilibrium, every individual takes σ as given and chooses strong family ties
if the gains of doing so are positive and weak family ties otherwise. At this stage, it turns
out that there exists an equilibrium with weak family ties only if we make the relatively
innocuous:19
18When the labor market is rigid, the minimum wage, w =( 1− c)/2, obtained by immobile workers,
is smaller than 1−c, the wage of mobile workers. This implies that individuals with weak family ties are
always mobile.
19If this assumption were not satisﬁed then the value of family ties in a society where nobody else
values them is larger that the maximum salary that one can obtain in the market.
12Assumption 2: when the share of population with strong family ties goes to 0, the utility
gains induced by strong family ties are smaller than the maximum wage gains obtained
by changing of location:
Δ(0) < 1.
2.3 Equilibria
Under assumptions 1 and 2, Figure 1 shows the function Γ(σ) which implies two stable
Nash equilibria. There is an equilibrium (point A on Figure 1) where everybody chooses
weak family ties and then vote for labor market ﬂexibility. In that case, the labor market
is competitive: everyone is paid his marginal productivity. Labor mobility is high since
everyone changes his location in this equilibrium. On the other hand, there is another
equilibrium (point B on Figure 1) where everyone chooses strong family ties and then vote
for stringent labor market regulation. The labor market is monopsonistic because workers
are immobile. This is the reason why people vote for stringent labor market regulation.
Production, employment and wages are lower with rigid labor markets than with
ﬂexible labor markets. However, it is important to remark that the equilibrium with
ﬂexible labor markets does not necessarily Pareto-dominate the equilibrium with rigid
labor markets. Actually, the equilibrium with rigid labor markets and strong family ties
dominates if Δ(1) > 1−
(1−c)2
2 , since the expected utility is Δ(1)+
(1−c)2
2 in the equilibrium
with strong family ties and 1 in the equilibrium with weak family ties. Otherwise, the
equilibrium with weak family ties yields higher welfare. Accordingly, the economy can be
coordinated on an equilibrium with too rigid labor markets, when Δ(1) < 1 −
(1−c)2
2 ,b u t
also on an equilibrium with too ﬂexible labor markets, when Δ(1) > 1−
(1−c)2
2 . As shown
in Figure 2, it turns out that labor market regulation is the preferred equilibrium if the
valuation of strong family ties when everyone has strong family ties, Δ(1), is high relative
to c, the cost of labor market regulation.
13A slightly diﬀerent way of rephrasing this result is that in countries or historical
periods when family ties can bring about great gains then the beneﬁts of family ties may
compensate for the loss of eﬃciency caused by labor market regulations.
2.4 The dynamics of family values
Following the seminal papers of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), we assume that pater-
nalistic parents wish to transmit their own values to their children. Suppose that each
individual lives for one period, has one child, and has payoﬀs as before. Her child inherits
her family values with probability p>1/2 and is free to choose her family values with
probability 1−p.A si tw i l lb ec l e a rb e l o w ,p>1/2 ensures that the transmission of family
ties inﬂuences the dynamics of labor market regulation. When p ≤ 1/2, the stickiness
in the transmission of family ties is not suﬃcient to inﬂuence the choice of labor market
regulation.
The sequence of events outlined above is now repeated in each period with an inﬁnite
horizon, with the only change being that only a fraction 1 − p of the population chooses
family values; a fraction pσt−1 is constrained to have strong family ties and a fraction
p(1 − σt−1) to have weak family ties. In other words we add some stickiness to the
transmission of family ties. Not everyone can freely choose a set of family ties every
generation.
• If σ0 > 1/2p, the share of individuals with strong family ties is necessarily larger
than 1/2 in period 1. Then, the median voter chooses to regulate the labor market
and every individual is better oﬀ with strong family ties. Since there are at least
p(1−σ0) individuals with weak family ties in period 1, the share of individuals with
strong family ties in period 1 is
σ1 =1− p(1 − σ0) > 1/2.
14Then, in periods t ≥ 1, the labor market is regulated and the share of individuals
with strong family ties
σt =1− p
t(1 − σ0).
converges to one when t goes to inﬁnity.
• If σ0 < 1−(1/2p), the same type of reasoning shows that the economy has a ﬂexible
labor market in period t>0 and that
σt = σ0p
t,
converges to zero when t goes to inﬁnity.
• If σ0 ∈ [1/2p,1 − (1/2p)], there are two possible equilibria in periods t>0 as
far as σt−1 remains in the interval [1/2p,1 − (1/2p)]. If σt−1 does not belong to this
interval, the dynamics of σ after date t is described by one of the two cases described
above.
This simple analysis shows how societies starting with a large share of individuals with
strong family ties have strong labor market regulations, whereas societies starting with
weak family ties have ﬂexible labor markets. This analysis shows a two way interaction
between culture and institutions.
3 Family ties and the demand for labor market reg-
ulation
Our model yields two important predictions. First, individuals with stronger family ties
prefer a more stringent labor market regulation, because they want to stay geographically
immobile and they need to be protected from the monopsony power of ﬁrms. Second,
the strength of family ties can persist over time and can have persistent eﬀects on labor
market regulation if family values are transmitted across generations. In this section
15we seek to establish the ﬁrst implication of the model according to which family ties
drive the demand for labor market regulation. We document two points related to this
implication: i) countries where a larger share of individuals have strong family ties have
a more stringent labor market regulation, ii) strong family ties predict strong demand
for job security and wage regulation, and not just a high level of actual regulation. The
second implication is tested in the next section.
3.1 Data
We use two main databases to measure family ties and the demand for regulation. The
data on family ties comes from the World Values Survey (WVS), an international social
survey of four waves 1981-84, 1990-93, 1995 and 1999-2003, denoted henceforth 1980, 1990,
1995 and 2000. This survey provides, among other things, a wide range of indicators on
the importance of the family in an individual life. The ﬁrst question asks directly how
important is the family in one person’s life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1
being very important and 4 not important at all). The second question probes whether
the respondent agrees with one of the two statements (taking the values of 1 and 2
respectively): 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one
must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the duty to respect and love
parents who have not earned it. The third question investigates whether the respondents
agree with one of the following statements (again taking the values of 1 or 2 respectively):
1) It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own
well-being; 2) Parents have a life of their own. Following Alesina and Giuliano (2007),
we combine these measures by extracting the ﬁrst principal component from the four
waves. We coded the questions so that a higher number corresponds to stronger family
ties, therefore a higher coeﬃcient of the principal component indicates stronger family
16ties.20
We measure the demand for job security using the following question in the four waves
of the WVS “Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please
look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job?: Good
Job Security”.21 The answers take on the value 1 if job security is mentioned and zero
otherwise. The WVS does not provide a direct question on labor market regulation, but
reports a question on the responsibility of the state to protect individuals. The question
reads: “Do you think people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves or
The government should take more responsibility?”. The answer takes on values from 1 to
10, a higher score indicating a preference for government responsibility. The WVS also
provides a question on state supervision over ﬁrms: “Do you think that the state should
give freedom to the ﬁrms or should control ﬁrms?”. This question is available for a smaller
set of countries and only in the fourth wave.
The demand for wage regulation is measured by using the International Social Survey
Program. The ISSP is a compilation of surveys, covering all OECD and Eastern European
countries, devoted each year to diﬀerent speciﬁc topics such as religion, social networks or
the role of government. A speciﬁc ISSP survey on “The role of government” was carried
out in 1996, providing a speciﬁc question on the regulation of wages: “Here is a list of
potential government actions for the economy: Control wages by law?”. The answer can
take on values from 1, strongly agree, to 4, strongly disagree. We recode the question so
that a higher number implies more regulation, in addition, to ease the interpretation of
t h er e s u l t s ,w er e c o d et h ev a r i a b l ea sad u m m yt a k i n gt h ev a l u eo f1i ft h er e s p o n d e n t
20The index of family ties is unbalanced for the wave 1980, the ﬁrst sub-index on the importance of
family being not reported for this wave.
21The other aspects included in the survey are: not too much pressure, a job respected by people in
general, good hours, generous holidays, an opportunity to use initiative, a job in which you feel you can
achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, a job that meets one’s abilities, pleasant
people to work with, good chances for promotion, a useful job for society, meeting people, working
conditions, to have time oﬀ at the weekends.
17agrees and 0 if he/she disagrees. The results remain unchanged with the original coding.
We measure regulation in the labor market using two diﬀerent indicators, one on
ﬁring costs and one on the stringency of the minimum wage regulation. Firing costs are
measured using the index of the World Bank for the year 2004 (see Botero et al., 2004).
This index measures ﬁring costs in terms of weeks of salary and it is based on three
components: i) the notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous
employment, ii) the severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment
and iii) the legally mandated penalty for redundancy dismissal. We focus on this indicator
because it covers much more countries than the OECD employment protection index, and
it displays more heterogeneity than the World Bank indicator of the diﬃculty of ﬁring.
The index can take values from 0 to 200.
The stringency of the minimum wages regulation is measured through a composite
index constructed by the ILO.22 The index combines information on i) the level of the
minimum wage and ii) on the existence of legal minimum wages and the extent of potential
derogation. The index refers to the year 2006. The ﬁrst component of the index, the level
of the wage ﬂoor, is measured as the monthly minimum wage expressed in US dollars.
T om a k et h i sm e a s u r ec o m p a r a b l ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e s ,w ec a l c u l a t et h es h a r eo ft h em o n t h l y
minimum wage as a function of per capita income in 2006. Income per capita is taken
from the World Bank. The second component of the index measures the stringency of the
minimum wage legislation, that is the extent to which the state directly regulates by law
the labor market instead of letting the civil society negotiates. This component can take
the following values:
• 1 if there is a legal statutory minimum wage and if the minimum wage is set at the
national level without any derogation.
• 0.5 if there is a legal statutory minimum wage but with derogations by age, qualiﬁ-
22This index is described more precisely in Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008).
18cation, region, sector or occupation; or if the wage ﬂoor is set by collective bargaining
but extended to all workers.
• 0 if the wage is set by collective bargaining and only applies to the unionized workers.
The overall index is the product of these two components.
3.2 Cross country correlations
Figures 3 and 4 show the positive cross-country correlation between family ties and the
regulation of labor market through ﬁring cost and the minimum wage regulation. The x-
axis reports the country-level indicator of the strength of family ties. Northern European
countries display the weakest ties, while African, Asian and Latin American countries have
the strongest family ties. Southern European countries and Eastern European countries
fall in the middle range.23 Countries with stronger family ties tend to have a more
regulated labor market (as measured by both higher ﬁring costs and a more stringent
regulation of the minimum wage). Consistently with the model, Figure 5 shows that
countries with stronger family ties are also associated with lower GDP per capita. GDP
per capita is taken from the World Bank and averaged out for the period 1980-2000. In
low income countries, people rely much more on the family than in high income countries
and labor markets are more regulated.
Figure 6 shows the basic cross-country correlation between the strength of family ties
and the preference for job security in a job. We measure on the y-axis the country-share of
individuals who indicate that job security is important in a job by averaging the answers
over the waves 1980-2000 of the WVS. African, Asian, Latin American and Southern
European countries display both the greatest concern for job security and the strongest
family ties. This yields a positive relation between the strength of family ties and support
for job security. Figure 7 shows that the same picture holds between family ties and the
23For a detailed description of the index of family ties see also Alesina and Giuliano (2007, 2009)
19demand for wage regulation. Countries with strong family ties display a higher support
for wage regulation by the government.
Table 1 reports the correlations in regressions controlling for legal origin, which is the
traditional alternative theory to explain regulation and its economic consequences (see
Botero et al., 2004; or Laporta et al., 2008). The correlation between the strength of
family ties and ﬁring cost is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
The relationship between the stringency of state regulation of minimum wage and family
ties is also positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Income per capita is
negatively correlated with the strength of family ties, the relationship being statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
The economic impact of family ties is sizeable. In terms of labor regulation, an increase
in the strength of family ties by one standard error (across countries) is associated with a
12 percent increase in ﬁring costs and about a 25 percent increase over the average of ﬁring
costs. A one standard error increase in the strength of family ties would be associated
with a 7.7 percent decrease in the average of (ln) income per capita.
3.3 Micro evidence: country ﬁxed eﬀects
Obviously cross-country correlations have to be taken only as illustrative because many
omitted variables may inﬂuence the relationship we are interested in. Many of these
concerns can be addressed by turning to micro evidence controlling for country ﬁxed
eﬀects. In addition, we also interact country ﬁxed eﬀects with time eﬀects in order to
control for speciﬁc trends in each country such as the evolution of the unemployment
rate. We regress the indicators of demand for regulation and employment prospects on
the index of family ties. Our set of controls include a quadratic for age, a gender dummy,
years of education, income, employment and marital status and the number of children.
In addition, the demand for regulation may be linked to risk aversion. We control for this
20using two questions from the WVS. The ﬁrst one reads: “Now I would like you to tell me
your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with
the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose
any number in between. One should be cautious about making major changes in life
versus You will never achieve much unless you act boldly”. The second question reads:
“Now I want to ask you some questions about your outlook on life. Each card I show you
has two contrasting statements on it. Using the scale listed, could you tell me where you
would place your own view? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left,
10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any
number in between. I worry about diﬃculties changes may cause. I welcome possibilities
that something new is beginning”. The second question is only available for the wave
2000 and has been used as a robustness check but without any diﬀerence. We run the
microestimates on a maximum of 56 countries. The descriptive statistics are reported in
Table B1.
Table 2 reports the results. Column (1) shows the relationship between family ties
and the preference for job security. The correlation is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level, but the coeﬃcient is smaller then in cross country regressions. An increase
in the strength of family ties by one standard error (across countries) is associated with an
increase of 2% in the probability to mention job security as a key aspect of a good job. This
eﬀect is of the same order of magnitude as the one associated with a one standard error
increase in years of education. Column (2) shows the relationship between the strength of
family ties and the demand for more job protection legislation. The correlation is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Column (3) shows that individuals with
strong family ties are also more likely to prefer government’s control of ﬁrms.
Strong family ties are not associated with a demand for all types of regulation. In
21particular, we should expect individuals with strong family ties to be more in favor of
competition on the goods market to oﬀset the monopsony power of ﬁrms. This is actu-
ally true in the WVS. We can measure attitudes towards competition with the following
question: “Do you think that competition is good or that competition is harmful”. The
answers range from 1 to 10, with a higher score indicating attitudes more hostile towards
competition. We estimate the relationships with family ties by controlling for the same
set of individual characteristics as in Table 2 and by including country-ﬁxed eﬀects in-
teracted with time dummies. The correlation between family ties and hostility towards
competition turns out to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.24
An interpretation of this result is that people with stronger family ties want more com-
petition on the product market, which increases the mobility of capital and reduces the
monopsony power of ﬁrms.
4P e r s i s t e n c e
Our model shows that culturally transmitted family values can have a persistent impact on
labor market regulation and on economic outcomes. In this section, we provide evidence
on this phenomenon. First, we show that immigrants coming from stronger family ties
societies are less mobile, face a wage and employment penalty and also ask for more
government regulation of wages and job security even when they live in a country diﬀerent
than their country of origin, the United States.25 Second, we show that the strength of
family ties inherited from countries of origin before 1940 is correlated with the stringency
of labor market regulation in the countries of origin at the beginning of the 21st century.
24Results available from the authors.
25The use of immigrants (ﬁrst or second generation) to study the importance of culture on economic
behavior is becoming relatively standard in the analysis of culture. See Alesina and Giuliano (2007), Algan
and Cahuc (2005, 2009), Antecol (2000), Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994), Fernandez and Fogli (2006,2009),
Giuliano (2007) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) among others. Alesina and Giuliano (2007)
have shown that second generation U.S. immigrants inherit the family values of their country of origin.
In this paper, we extent this analysis by focusing on the relation between family values in the country of
origin, the wage and the demand for labor market regulation of U.S. second generations immigrants.
224.1 The intergenerational transmission of family ties
To perform our analysis, we associate to second-generation immigrants born in the U.S. the
measure of family ties of their country of origin, deﬁned as the average set of beliefs toward
the family from their parents country of origin. If values are inherited from previous
generations, those beliefs should be signiﬁcant for second-generation immigrants; if values
are not transmitted across generations, then this variable should not be important in the
determination of economic behavior amongst immigrants, as they are now in a diﬀerent
country.
4.1.1 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
We use two main datasets: the General Social Survey (GSS) and the March Supplement
of the Current Population Survey. We use the GSS to study the impact of family values on
attitudes towards labor market regulation and to analyze the correlation between attitudes
i n h e r i t e db e f o r e1 9 4 0a n dt h er e g u l a t i o ni nt he countries of origin at the beginning of the
21st century. We use the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey of the U.S.
to study labor market outcomes of immigrants.
The General Social Survey covers the period 1972-2004 and provides information on
the place of birth and the country of origin of the respondent’s forbearers since 1977.
The GSS variable for the country of origin reads as follows: “From what countries or
part of the world did your ancestors come?”. The individual can report up to three
countries of origin by order of preference. Two respondents out of three report only one
country of origin. We select the GSS ethnic variable that captures the country of origin
to which the respondent feels the closest to make the comparison between countries of
origin interpretable. Respondents are asked if they were born in the United States and
how many of their parents and grand-parents were born in the country. The answers to
the question of parents’ birthplace are scaled 0 if both parents are born in the US, 1 if
23only the mother was born in the US, and 2 if only the respondent’s father was born in the
country. The answers to the grand-parents’ bi r t h p l a c ea r es c a l e df r o m0t o4i n d i c a t i n g
the number of grandparents born in the US. We have a large number of observations
for 26 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom. We drop from the analysis immigrants who generically state they are coming
from a certain geographical region (such as people of African origin) and limit our analysis
to immigrants coming from a well deﬁned country. The descriptive statistics are reported
in Table B1 in the Appendix. To maximize the number of observations we combine
second, third and fourth generation immigrants, therefore we deﬁne an immigrant as a
person born in the US but with at least one of his/her ancestors (parents or grand-fathers)
born abroad.
The GSS provides speciﬁc questions related to attitudes towards job security and
regulation. Preferences for job security arem e a s u r e db yt h eq u e s t i o n :“ W o u l dy o up l e a s e
look at this card and tell me which one thing on this list you would most prefer in a
job? No danger of being ﬁred”. The answer is ranked from 1, for the most important
characteristic, to 4 for the last important. Attitudes toward regulation of jobs and wages
are given by the following questions: “Here are some things the government might do
for the economy: Supporting declining industries to protect jobs. Regulate wages”. The
answers range from 1 for strongly agree, 2 for agree, 3 for neither, 4 for disagree to 5 for
strongly disagree. We recode these questions so that a higher number is associated with
a higher desire for regulation.
The March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) is the only recent
available dataset in which individuals were asked (starting from 1994) about their parents
24country of origin.26 We deﬁne second generation immigrants by looking at the country of
origin of fathers’ respondent in order to maximize the number of observations.27 We pool
ﬁfteen years of data to have a higher number of observations. We use the CPS to study
the following outcomes predicted by the model: geographical mobility, unemployment and
wages. In the CPS we do have data on almost all countries covered in the World Values
Survey.28
For both attitudes and labor market outcomes, we run the following OLS or probit
(depending on the nature of the left hand side variable) regressions:
Yic = α0 + α1family_tiesc + α2Xi + δs + εic
where Yic is our variable of interest for an immigrant i whose forbearer was born in country
c. Xi are individual controls, which vary according to the nature of the left hand side
variable, and family_tiesc is the measure of strong family ties calculated from the WVS
in the country of origin. We also control for a full set of state or county dummies whenever
possible. All standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
4.1.2 Results
Tables 3 to 5 report the evidence for the following labor market outcomes of US immi-
grants: mobility, unemployment and log real hourly wages. The estimates are based on
the Current Population Survey. Mobility is deﬁned as a dummy equal to 1 if the indi-
v i d u a lm o v e df r o m / i nad i ﬀ e r e n ts t a t e ,o ra b r o a di nt h el a s tﬁ v ey e a r s .U n e m p l o y e di sa
26The Census reports the information about the father’s country of origin until 1970.
27The CPS also reports the country of origin of the mother, but the sample size would be smaller due
to a much higher number of missing observations.
28The CPS has data on second generation individuals from the following countries of origin: Puerto
Rico, Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Finland, Norway, Sweden, England, Ireland, Northn Ireland, Belgium, France,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tussia, Ukraine, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan,Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
25dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Log hourly wage is deﬁned as total wage
income divided by the number of hours worked in a year,29 and corrected for inﬂation.
We regress each outcome on our measure of family ties (column 1) and each subcom-
ponent (columns 2 through 4). The mobility regression (Table 3, column 1) controls for
education, marital and employment status, real family income, number of children in the
household, in addition to gender and a quadratic term for age. The standard errors are
clustered at the country of origin level. Our speciﬁcation also includes state dummies
to take into account local labor market characteristics of the area where immigrants live
that could drive the results. All the controls have the expected sign: unemployed people
are more likely to move (most likely to ﬁnd a better job). Higher income and higher
education tend to discourage mobility. Married people tend to move less, similarly to
women (although the gender eﬀect is not signiﬁcant). The results are signiﬁcant at the
1% level for our combined index and at 5% or 1% for each one of the subcomponents.
As a robustness check, in column 5, we include county dummies, to better control for the
possibility that immigrants coming from diﬀerent countries select in diﬀerent areas.
Table 4 reports the results for the probability of being unemployed. People with strong
family ties, who want to stay close to their families, should have a higher unemployment
rate, as they are less willing to migrate and have a higher reservation wage. We ﬁnd that
the probability of being unemployed is indeed substantially higher for people belonging
to strong family ties.30
Table 5 reports a standard Mincer wage regression where log hourly wages are regressed
on education and a quadratic in potential experience (deﬁned as age minus number of
years of education minus six). We also control for marital status and gender. Higher
29The CPS has information on both the number of weeks worked in a year and the number of hours
usually worked in a week.
30This result is also in line with Bentolila and Ichino (2008), who ﬁnd that the losses associated with
unemployment are much lower in Mediterranean societies with strong family ties, as the family provides
insurance.
26experience increases wages, as expected, together with education. Single people and
women tend to have lower wages. Our measure of family ties and all the sub-components
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages: people with strong family ties have lower wages as
predicted by our model. In columns 5 and 6 we report the wage regression, by splitting
the sample between low educated and highly educated workers. We expect the impact of
family ties being stronger for highly educated people as they are more inclined to move
and ﬁnd a better match in the labor market, whereas for people with a lower level of
human capital there is little to gain in moving to another location. The results conﬁrm
this prediction: weak family ties are more relevant in the determination of wages for highly
educated workers but their impact is smaller for people with a lower level of human capital.
Following the speciﬁcation for the other outcomes, column 7 controls for county dummies.
Our indicator of strong family ties is still a signiﬁcant determinant of wages for second
generation immigrants.
In terms of magnitude of the results, we can easily compute the impact of a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the measure of family ties: it leads to a 1 percent increase in
the probability of moving and being unemployed, which is equivalent to 14 percent and
10 percent of the average of these two variables respectively. The impact is smaller for
wages, where an increase in standard deviation in the measure of family ties, implies a
decrease in log wages of 0.02 which is 1 percent of the sample average. As for comparison
with other variables: an increase in one standard deviation in the variable measuring the
lowest level of education (up to 12 years of schooling) implies an increase in probabil-
ity of being unemployed and moving to a diﬀerent place of 2.5 percent and 1 percent,
respectively. The impact of education on wages is, as expected, much higher than the
measure of family ties (lower education implies a reduction in log wages of the order of 32
percent). One possibility to explain the higher impact of family ties on mobility and less
on unemployment and wages could be due to the fact that since individuals do not move
27to stay close to their families they might decide to invest less in education to start with.
Our analysis is based on evidence from the Current Population Survey, since this
dataset is the closest in time to the data on family ties taken from the World Values
Survey. As a robustness check, we report in the Appendix (Tables B2 to B4) results for
our outcomes of interest, drawn from the Censuses 1940, 1960 and 1970.31 We run the
regressions under the assumption that values about family ties that we observe today have
been fairly stable over time, so we assume that they did not change in the last 70 years or
so. Our results are remarkably consistent with those found using the Current Population
Survey: today as well as 70 years ago, immigrants coming from strong family ties societies
tend to have lower mobility rates, lower wages and a higher level of unemployment.
Finally, we look at the implication of inherited family values on the demand for regula-
tion. As shown above, individuals who have inherited strong family values are less mobile
and suﬀer from employment and wage penalty. According to our model, this should lead
them to ask for more regulation of jobs and wages. We test this implication by looking
at the attitudes towards labor market regulation of US immigrants in the GSS.
Table 6 reports the corresponding micro evidence based on individual answers from
the GSS. We regress the US immigrants’ attitudes towards job security and job regulation
on the strength of family ties in the home country. We control for age, age squared, years
of education, gender, income, employment and marital status, and number of children.
We also include state ﬁxed eﬀects to control for local labor market conditions. Standard
errors are clustered at the country of origin level. The results are highly consistent with the
previous cross-country estimates. US immigrants coming from strong family ties countries
tend to consider job security as a more important characteristic for a job. They are also
more prone to consider that the government should save jobs or directly intervene to
regulate wages. The eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 or 5 percent level. They
31The Census 1950 does not contain the variable on geographical mobility.
28are also economically sizeable. An increase in the strength of family ties by one standard
error is associated with an increase of 5.5 percent in the probability to think that job
security is key for a good job. This eﬀect is of the same order of magnitude as that
associated with an increase by one standard error in income categories.
4.2 The persistent impact of family values
In this section, we investigate the persistence of family values and their long lasting impact
on labor market regulations. We show that attitudes toward the family of immigrants
arrived in the US before 1940 are correlated with attitudes toward the family today. We
also show that attitudes toward the family of immigrants arrived in the US before 1940
are related to the labor market regulations at the beginning of the twenty ﬁrst century.
We focus on family values before World War II since the main labor market institutions
have been implemented in the post-war period.
4.2.1 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
The strength of family ties before World War II cannot be observed directly, since there
is no survey available on this period. However, we can detect family ties for this period
by looking at the family values inherited from their country of origin by U.S. immigrants
whose forebears arrived in the U.S. before 1940. We still use the GSS which yields in-
formation on the country of origin of immigrants since 1977. In order to get enough
observations, we use information on: i) second generation immigrants born before 1940,
since their parents immigrated in the U.S. before 1940; ii) third generation immigrants
born before 1965, since their grand parents arrived in the U.S. before 1940 (assuming a
gap of 25 years between generations); iii) fourth generation immigrants born before 1990.
The GSS does not contain the same variables on family ties of the World Value survey.
To measure the strength of family ties we use the following variable: “How often do you
spend a social evening with relatives?”. The respondent can answer: almost every day,
29once or twice a week, several times a month, about once a month, several times a year,
about once a year, never. The answers have been coded from 1 to 7 so that a higher
frequency of meetings with relatives corresponds to stronger family ties.
We run the following OLS regression:
Yic = β0 + β1Xi +Φ c + εic
where Yic is the strength of family ties for an immigrant i whose forebear was born in
country c. Xi is a vector of individual controls which includes gender, age, education and
income. Φc is a country of origin ﬁxed eﬀect, which measures the inﬂuence of inherited
values on contemporaneous values. Φc can be interpreted as a proxy for the family values
the immigrants had before 1940 in the country of origin. εic is an error term. All standard
errors are clustered at the country of origin level. The reference country is Mexico.
4.2.2 Results
Figure 8 shows that there is a strong correlation between the measure of the strength of
family ties for immigrants arrived before 1940, corresponding to the country of origin ﬁxed
eﬀects in the micro regression on family ties in the GSS, and the family ties measured
with the WVS over the period 1980-2000. The correlation coeﬃcient is equal to 0.62. This
result conﬁrms that there is a strong inertia in family values in most countries. Figure 8
also suggests that there has been a drop in the strength of family ties in Nordic countries
such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland.
We then look at the correlation between family ties before 1940 and the stringency of
employment protection in 2004. Figure 9 shows that there is a strong positive correlation
between the two variables. The correlation coeﬃcient is equal to 0.55. Figure 10 shows
that the same strong positive correlation shows up between the strength of family ties
before 1940 and the stringency of minimum wage regulation in 2006. The correlation
coeﬃcient is equal to 0.47. Table 7 shows the OLS estimations controlling for legal origin.
30The correlation between labor market institutions in the 2000s and family values prior to
1940 is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Finally, the results obtained in this section are in line with the prediction of the model
according to which family values have persistent eﬀects on labor market regulation if the
intergenerational transmission of family values is suﬃciently strong. Empirical evidence
does show the existence of transmission of family values over one, two and even three
generations. Moreover, labor market regulations seem to have deep cultural roots since
labor market rigidities in the beginning of the twenty ﬁrst century are correlated with
family values prevailing before WWII.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Labor market deregulation requires geographical mobility, otherwise ﬁrms can take ad-
vantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. However, geographical
mobility requires relatively weak family ties. That is, individuals should not experience a
too high utility loss if they need to move away from their family of origin. Such costs may,
instead, be high in cultures that value family ties, and therefore family closeness. As a
result countries with strong family ties rationally favor a host of labor market regulations,
in order to restrict the monopsony power of ﬁrms. Family values may evolve over time,
although slowly. In places with laissez-faire labor markets, parents have an incentive to
teach children the beneﬁts of mobility. In countries with regulated labor markets, the
beneﬁt of mobility are much lower and parents can, if they choose to do so, teach the
value of family ties, since they come at lower or no costs. Thus we can have two equilibria
with a two way causality between family ties and labor market regulation.
We investigate this correlation between family values and attitudes toward labor mar-
ket regulation and preferences for job security versus free labor market both with cross
country evidence and evidence drawn from immigrants in the US. In both cases we found
31rather strong conﬁrmation of this correlation. The correlation between labor market reg-
ulation and relatively slow moving cultural traits regarding the family, and the fact that
labor market regulation is complementary to certain family values explain the diﬃculty
in liberalizing labor markets. In a sense the relatively low employment and ineﬃciency
associated with labor market regulation is the price that certain countries choose to pay
in order to enjoy the beneﬁts of family ties and closeness.
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37APPENDIX A
The aim of this appendix is to analyze the model when assumption 1 is not fulﬁlled in
order to provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of every equilibrium.
Stage 3 is described in the main text. Let us describe stages 2 and 1.
Stage 2:
I ns t a g e2 ,p e o p l ev o t et oc h o o s el a b o rm a r k e ti n s t i t u t i o n s .T h es h a r eo fi n d i v i d u a l s
with strong family ties, σ, chosen in stage 1 is given.
• First, let us analyze the situation where Δ(σ) > (1−c)/2. Then, if the labor market
is rigid, workers with strong family ties are immobile, since Δ(σ) > 1 − c − Δ(σ)




R =( 1− R)w +Δ ( σ). (10)
We can compute the maximum expected utility that an individual with strong family
ties gets with a regulated labor market and compare it with what he gets when labor
market are ﬂexible to know when regulation is chosen rather than ﬂexibility. The
optimal labor market regulation is the couple of values of the minimum wage w and
of the reservation productivity R that maximizes the expected utility of workers
with strong family ties, deﬁned by equation (10), subject to the zero proﬁt condition:
  1
R
(y − c − w)dy =0 . (11)
It is easily checked that the solution is




Then, in case of stringent labor market regulation, workers with strong family ties







+Δ ( σ). (13)
38Comparison of equations (2) and (6) implies that a median voter with strong
family ties prefers a regulated labor market rather than a ﬂexible labor market
when Δ(σ) > (1−c)/2.I fΔ(σ) > 1/2,U S
F =Δ ( σ) and it is obvious that US
R >U S
F.
If (1 − c)
2 /2 < Δ(σ) < 1/2,U S





• Now, let us analyze the situation where σ>1/2 and Δ(σ) ≤ (1−c)/2. In this case,
individuals with strong family ties move if they do not get a job in their birth place.









(y − c − w)dy =0 . (15)
w +Δ ( σ) ≥ 1 − c − Δ(σ) (16)
Let us denote by λ and μ the Kuhn and Tucker multipliers associated with con-
straints (14) and (16). The ﬁrst order conditions are
1 − c − w − 2Δ(σ) − λ(R − c − w)=0 (17)
(1 − R) − λ(1 − R) − μ =0 (18)
Suppose that constraint (16) is not binding so that μ =0 . From equation (17),
μ =0implies that λ =1 . Then, equations (15) and (18) imply that
R =1− 2Δ(σ) and w =1− c − Δ(σ) (19)
It turns out that constraint (16) is never binding. Therefore, in the case where
σ>1/2 and Δ(σ) ≤ (1 − c)/2, equations (14) and (19) imply that the expected




R =1− c − Δ(σ)[1− 2Δ(σ)],




if the labor market is ﬂexible. Individuals with strong family ties prefer labor market
rigidity if and only if
1 − c − Δ(σ)[1− 2Δ(σ)] > 1 − Δ(σ)
which is equivalent to
c<2[Δ(σ)]
2 .
Finally, the situation which arises in stage 2, where individuals vote to choose the type
of labor market institution, can be summarized as follows:
• if σ ≤ 1/2, the median voter, who has weak family ties, chooses labor market
ﬂexibility.
• if σ>1/2, the median voter, who has strong family ties, chooses to regulate the
labor market if either Δ(σ) > (1 − c)/2,o rΔ(σ) ≤ (1 − c)/2 and c<2[Δ(σ)]
2 .
Otherwise, the median voter chooses labor market ﬂexibility. Figure 11 depicts the
choice of voters when σ ≥ 1/2 in the (c,Δ) plane. It turns out that labor market
rigidity is always chosen if Δ ≥ 1/2. This condition is satisﬁed if Δ(σ) ≥ 1/2 since
Δ (σ) ≥ 0.
Let us denote by F the set of values of σ such that ﬂexibility is chosen in stage 2.
Stage 1
In stage one, individuals choose their family values. They have perfect foresights. If
they anticipate that the share of individuals with strong family ties belongs to F, they
also anticipate that labor market ﬂexibility will be the outcome of the vote in stage
402. Otherwise, the outcome of the vote will be labor market regulation. Therefore, the




max[Δ(σ),1 − Δ(σ)] if σ ∈ F
Δ(σ)+
(1−c)2
2 if σ/ ∈ F and Δ(σ) > 1−c
2
1 − c − Δ(σ)[1− 2Δ(σ)] if σ/ ∈ F and Δ(σ) ≤ 1−c
2
and the expected utility of individuals with weak family ties is32
 
1 if σ ∈ F
1 − c if σ/ ∈ F.





max[Δ(σ),1 − Δ(σ)] − 1 if σ ∈ F
Δ(σ) − 1−c2
2 if σ/ ∈ F and Δ(σ) > 1−c
2
Δ(σ)[2Δ(σ) − 1] if σ/ ∈ F and Δ(σ) ≤ 1−c
2
In a Nash equilibrium, every individual takes σ as given and chooses strong family ties
if the gains of doing so are positive and weak family ties otherwise.
It turns out that there exists a stable Nash equilibrium with σ =0only if assumption
2 is satisﬁed, i.e. if Δ(0) < 1. If assumption 2 is not fulﬁlled, it is easily checked that
Γ(σ) > 0 for all σ, which implies that there is a single equilibrium with σ =1 .
If assumption 2 is fulﬁlled, there is a stable equilibrium with σ =0 . Then the deﬁnition
of Γ(σ) implies that there is either no other stable equilibrium if Δ(1) ≤ 1−c2
2 or another
stable equilibrium with σ =1if Δ(1) > 1−c2
2 .
32When the labor market is ﬂexible, the minimum wage, w =( 1−c)/2, obtained by immobile workers,





  WVS 1980-2000  GSS 1977-2004  CPS 1994-2008 
  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Age  41.12 16.50 46.13 17.62  36.74  13.58 
Female  .53 .49 .55 .49  .49  .50 
Education 18.2  5.41  13.26  2.85     
<=12 years of schooling          .43  .49 
Some  college       .32  .46 
Income 4.60  2.42  10.47  2.44  -13003  763698 
Married  .62 .48 .55 .49  .51  .50 
Single       .36  .48 
Children  1.82 1.66 1.83 1.70  .82  1.12 
Unemployed  .08 .28 .02 .16  .05  .21 
Employed  .52 .49 .63 .48     
Inactive  .38 .48 .34 .47     
Mobility       .11  .31 
Logwage       -7.85  9.15 



















Family Ties and Mobility  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
  Census 1940  Census 1960  Census 1970 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Mobility  Mobility  Mobility 
Strong family ties  -0.027  -0.028  -0.021 
 (0.009)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)* 
Age 0.004  -0.008  -0.008 
 (0.002)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Age squared  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Up to 12 years of schooling  -0.116  -0.132  -0.117 
 (0.014)***  (0.008)*** (0.009)*** 
Some college  -0.033  -0.040  -0.032 
 (0.006)***  (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Married -0.018  -0.021  -0.026 
 (0.005)***  (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Single -0.008  -0.067  -0.066 
 (0.007)  (0.004)***  (0.003)*** 
Female -0.007  -0.009  -0.010 
 (0.003)*  (0.003)***  (0.002)*** 
Unemployed -0.004  0.006  0.026 
 (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.007)*** 
Wage and salary income  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 38396  147193  121436 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Each 






Family Ties and Unemployment  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
  Census 1940  Census 1960  Census 1970 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Unemployment Unemployment  Unemployment
Strong  family  ties  0.043 0.015 0.007 
  (0.009)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Age  -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Age  2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Up to 12  0.067  0.038  0.023 
  (0.010)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Some  college  0.065 0.036 0.017 
  (0.022)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** 
Married  -0.071 -0.023 -0.014 
  (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** 
Single 0.001  0.003  -0.000 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female -0.041  0.002  0.007 
 (0.004)***  (0.002)  (0.002)*** 
Observations  24159 96755 82246 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Each 









Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
  Census 1940  Census 1960  Census 1970 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage  Log wage 
   Low  ed.  Highly  ed.   Low  ed.  Highly  ed.   Low  ed.  Highly  ed. 
Strong  family  ties  -0.048 -0.035 -0.117 -0.037 -0.033 -0.056 -0.064 -0.066 -0.074 
  (0.048) (0.045) (0.095) (0.032) (0.035)  (0.028)* (0.033)* (0.035)* (0.039)* 
Up to 12 years of  -0.513      -0.414      -0.527     
schooling  (0.041)***    (0.015)***    (0.019)***    
Some  college -0.122    -0.203    -0.301    
  (0.048)**     (0.012)***    (0.014)***    
Experience  0.038 0.035 0.052 0.020 0.017 0.029 0.022 0.021 0.026 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Experience  squar.  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Married  0.299 0.282 0.406 0.120 0.115 0.149 0.077 0.074 0.104 
  (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.066)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.022)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.022)*** 
Single  0.046  0.014  0.213 -0.007 -0.008 -0.021 -0.070 -0.048 -0.116 
  (0.030)  (0.030) (0.087)** (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.043)*** 
Female  -0.250 -0.275 -0.138 -0.354 -0.381 -0.249 -0.403 -0.430 -0.321 
  (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.046)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** 
Observations  15789 13724  2065  75584 60886 14698 69126 51838 17288 
R-squared  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.13 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Each regression controls for state 
fixed effects. Figure 1 
The relation between the gains Γ(σ) to choose strong family ties rather than weak family ties and the 
share σ of individuals with strong family ties 
 
0                                                1/2                                              1                     σ 
A   
      
Δ(σ)−1     
Δ(σ)−[(1−c2)/2)]     
B    
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Source: Firing costs: World Bank 2004; Family ties: WVS 1980-2000 
 
Figure 4 
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Correlation between the log of GDP per capita and family ties 
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Source: WVS 1980-2000 
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 Figure 7 
Correlation between the demand for wage regulation and family ties 
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Strength of family ties before 1940 and firing costs in 2004 
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Source : ILO 2007, Aghion et al. (2008) and WVS 1980-2000 
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 Figure 11 
The choice of labor market regulation in stage 2 when the share of individuals with strong family 
ties, σ, is larger than 1/2 
c  
 0                            1/2                                                     Δ  
2Δ












Family Ties and Labor Regulation 




 (1)  (2) (3) 
Strong family ties  .315**  .018**  -1.656*** 
 (.150)  (.007)  (.483) 
Civil Law  .392***  -.000  .087 
 (.122)  (.007)  (.395) 
Scandinavian Law  .148  -.021*  .868 
 (.213)  (.010)  (.684) 
German Law  .206  -.008  .167 
 (.153)  (.006)  (.484) 
Observations 58  46  58 
R-squared .27  .40  .33 
       Source: WVS: WB (2004) and ILO (2007): *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%; significant at 10%. 



















Table 2  
Family Ties, Employment and Preference for Job Security: Microestimates 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Important thing in a job: 
Job Security 
Government Should  
Protect Individuals 
Government Should  
Control Firms 
Strong family ties  .018***  .039***  .076* 
 (0.002)  (.013)  (.036) 
Age .003***  .008  .011 
 (.001)  (.008)  (.019) 
Age squared  -.000  -.000*  .000 
 (.000)  (.000)  (.000) 
Years of education  -.005***  -.023***  -.022*** 
 (.001)  (.005)  (.006) 
Married .016***  -.088**  .145 
 (.004)  (.037)  (.098) 
Number of children  .000  .009  .005 
 (.001)  (.017)  (.028) 
Female -.013**  -.195***  -.337*** 
 (.006)  (.042)  (.042) 
Employed .015*  -.123  -.004 
 (.008)  (.040)  (.087) 
Unemployed -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Income (1-12)  -.008***  -.114***  -.123*** 
 (.001)  (.018)  (.025) 
Risk Aversion  -.004***  -.012  .014 
 (.001)  (.012)  (.013) 
Time f.e.  yes  yes  yes 
Country f.e.  yes  yes  yes 
Country f.e.x time f.e.  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 52629  53629  8588 
R-squared .093  .096  .123 




Family Ties and Mobility  
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2008. Microestimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Strong  family  ties  -0.025      -0.018 
  (0.007)***      (0.006)*** 
Family  important    -0.085     
    (0.036)**     
Parents responsib.      -0.059     
     (0.016)***    
Respect parents        -0.069   
       (0.027)**   
Age  0.109 0.098 0.110 0.099 0.102 
  (0.128) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.117) 
Age  squared  -0.205 -0.177 -0.204 -0.188 -0.221 
 (0.142)  (0.146)  (0.142)  (0.144)  (0.134)* 
Up to 12 years of  -0.014  -0.015  -0.015  -0.016  -0.018 
schooling (0.005)***  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Some  college  -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
Married  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)* 
Single  -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.027 
 (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Female  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployed  0.046 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.040 
 (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Numb. of children  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.008 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Real  income  -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 
 (0.004)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Observations 80210 80592 80414 80388 79459 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. Mobility is defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or 




Family Ties and Unemployment.   
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2008. Microestimates 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Unemployed  Unemployed  Unemployed Unemployed Unemployed 
Strong  family  ties  0.014      0.012 
  (0.005)***      (0.005)*** 
Family  important    0.059     
    (0.019)***     
Parents  responsib.     0.037    
     (0.011)***    
Respect  parents       0.030  
       (0.018)*   
Age  -0.730 -0.719 -0.725 -0.727 -0.737 
 (0.129)***  (0.127)***  (0.131)*** (0.130)*** (0.121)*** 
Age  squared  0.810 0.792 0.806 0.801 0.820 
 (0.153)***  (0.152)***  (0.155)*** (0.155)*** (0.145)*** 
Up to 12 years of  0.052  0.052  0.052  0.054  0.050 
schooling (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Some  college 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.017 
 (0.004)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Married  -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Single  -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Numb.  of  children  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Female  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Observations 53938 54209 54092 54055 52344 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Unemployed is a 




Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages,  
Second Generation Immigrant, CPS 1994-2008. Microestimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







Strong  family  ties -0.053        -0.062 -0.141 -0.047 
 (0.018)***        (0.024)** (0.036)***  (0.017)*** 
Family  important    -0.209       
   (0.073)***          
Parents  responsib.     -0.120      
     (0.046)**      
Respect  parents      -0.139     
      (0.060)**     
Up to 12 years of  -0.655  -0.656  -0.657  -0.660      -0.641 
schooling  (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***    (0.017)*** 
Some  college  -0.420 -0.422 -0.422 -0.424      -0.409 
  (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***      (0.015)*** 
Experience  0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.039 0.043 0.037 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Experience  squar. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Married  0.095 0.095 0.094 0.095 0.110 0.126 0.093 
  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.009)*** 
Single  -0.120 -0.121 -0.121 -0.120 -0.118 -0.146 -0.124 
  (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.016)*** 
Numb. of children  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.009  -0.011  0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005)** (0.004) 
Female  -0.221 -0.222 -0.222 -0.221 -0.204 -0.245 -0.220 
  (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.014)*** 
Observations  51192 51439 51341 51290 22208 28984 51192 
R-squared  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.28 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Columns 1 through 6 control for 




Family Ties and Demand for Labor Regulation: 
Micro estimates on US-immigrants – GSS 1977-2004 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Important  thing   
in a job: security 
Government 
should save jobs 
Government should  
regulate wages 
Strong family ties    .374***  .406**  .491** 
in home country  (.093)  (.170)  (.199) 
Age -.009**  .021**  -.009 
 (.003)  (.010)  (.010) 
Age squared  .001***  -.000*  .000 
 (.000)  (.000)  (.000) 
Years of education  -.083***  -.022***  -.051*** 
 (.004)  (.007)  (.010) 
Married -.047**  -.084*  -.058 
 (.022)  (.041)  (.085) 
Female -.142***  -.026  .129*** 
 (.027)  (.039)  (.045) 
Children .008  .012  -.029 
 (.006)  (.021)  (.024) 
Unemployed .146**  .135  .026 
 (.056)  (.318)  (.018) 
Employed .067**  .050  -.038 
 (.030)  (.075)  (.047) 
Income -.023***  .005  -.056*** 
 (.004)  (.013)  (.010) 
State fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 7202  1159  1771 
R-squared .080  .054  .093 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.  









Inherited Family Ties Before 1940 and Labor Regulation 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  Firing costs  State regulation of  
minimum wage 
Inherited family ties   .426**  .017** 
before 1940  (.159)  (.008) 
Civil law origin  .042  -.007 
 (.141)  (.008) 
Scandinavian origin  -.180  -.031*** 
 (.170)  (.010) 
German origin  .004  -.013 
 (.151)  (.009) 
Observations 26  25 
R-squared .37  .48 
Source: GSS, ILO (2007) and Botero et al. (2004). The reference group for legal origin is common law. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 